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Discharge in bankruptcy: a comparative analysis of law and
practice between Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom
(UK) – What can we learn?
Ruzita Azmi*, Adilah Abd Razak and Siti Nur Samawati Ahmad
In common law jurisdictions such as Malaysia, United Kingdom and Singa-
pore, bankruptcy law is the legal mechanism in situations where individuals
fall into bankruptcy. In the UK, automatic discharge was introduced fifteen
years ago. Yet, no equivalent concept of automatic discharge has been intro-
duced in Singapore, while in Malaysia, although a new provision allowing
for an automatic discharge of bankrupt was proposed in the new Bankruptcy
(Amendment) Bill 2016, it has yet to come into force upon official
announcement by the Malaysian authorities. This paper examines and com-
pares the laws and practices of discharge of bankrupts in Malaysia, the UK
and Singapore.
1. Introduction
Malaysia has one of the most stringent bankruptcy laws in the world. Unsurpris-
ingly, the calls to review the country’s bankruptcy laws are not new. There have
been repeated calls and public uproar for the Malaysian government to review of
the Malaysian bankruptcy laws in providing more options for rehabilitation rather
than declaring the debtor as a bankrupt.1 It has been pointed out that in Malay-
sia, the individual debtor is often being ‘punished’ or adjudicated as a bankrupt
rather than given the necessary time period and opportunity for them to over-
come their financial crisis.2 It was also suggested that the government give a sec-
ond chance to those declared a bankrupt, especially young entrepreneurs.3
Malaysian bankruptcy law is also considered as the cumbersome process of dis-
charging a bankrupt and there is no automatic discharge until a new provision
allowing for an automatic discharge of bankrupt was proposed in the new
Bankruptcy (Amendment) Bill 2016 (Bill, 2016). Until the Bill 2016 comes into
*Corresponding author. Email: zita@uum.edu.my
© 2017 Commonwealth Secretariat
1See further Shahanaaz Habib, ‘A Second Chance for Bankrupts’ The Star Business Sec-
tion (2012), 4.
2N. Ismail, ‘Bankruptcy Law as Balancing the Interest Between Creditors and Debtors in
Malaysia: A Need for Law Reform’ (2011) 1 LNS (A) Xi.
3K Jamaluddin, ‘Reprieve for Bankrupts’ Asia One News (2 December, 2012) <http://
news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne+News/Malaysia/Story/A1Story20121202-387114.html>
viewed 22 May 2015.
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effect in Malaysia, once the creditors are satisfied with the compromise or
arrangement between them and the bankrupt, the Insolvency Department or the
Court will be informed so the discharge will be granted to the bankrupt. This
practice will take a longer time since it involves some procedures and documen-
tations.4
During the period of being ‘undischarged bankrupt’, the person faces a num-
ber of disabilities including being disqualified from holding any statutory post or
corporate directorship.5 Furthermore, freedom of movement is also restricted
4See note 2. In order to apply for discharge to the court a bankrupt must file Form 48
together with a certificate obtain from DGI specifying the number of his creditors. Once
the court fixes the date of hearing of the application, the registrar shall give notice of the
hearing in Form 50 to the DGI. Then DGI shall send a notice in Form 51 to each creditor
who has proved his debts. A creditor who has proved his debt may oppose an application
for discharge by giving notice of his opposition stating the grounds thereof to the DGI. A
bankrupt may apply to the DGI for discharge after five years after the date of receiving
order and adjudication order. If the DGI decides to grant the application he must serve a
notice of intention to issue the certificate of discharge in Form 51B. A creditor who
wishes to object may do so by furnishing a notice of the objection in Form 51C. See fur-
ther section 33(1)(A), 33(B) of BA 1967 and Rules 194–196 of the Bankruptcy Rules
(BR) 1969.
5Section 38(1)(d) of BA 1967 prohibits a bankrupt from entering into or carry on any
business either alone or in partnership, or become a director of any company or directly
or indirectly take part in the management of any company without the Director General
of Insolvency’s or court’s approval. A restriction to act as company director can also be
found in sections 11 of the UK’s Company Director Disqualification Act (CDDA) 1986.
Section 11 of CDDA 1986 provides that except with leave of court, undischarged bank-
rupts are disqualified from acting as directors or taking part in or being concerned in the
promotion, formation or management of the company.
2 R. Azmi et al.
since a bankrupt is not allowed to travel or move abroad.6 Bankruptcy attracts a
very negative connotation in that there remains a social stigma attached to it.7 In
the past, before the introduction of bankruptcy, discharged debtors faced
6In Malaysia, section 38(1)(c) of Bankruptcy Act 1967 (BA 1967) states that the bankrupt
shall not leave Malaysia without a prior permission of the Director General of Insolvency
(DGI) or of the court. In relation to this under section 38A(1) of BA 1967 the DGI may
by notice issued to any immigration officer requesting a bankrupt be prevented from leav-
ing Malaysia. In the case of Government of Malaysia & Ors v Loh Wai Kong, (1979] 2
MLJ 33, the restriction is seemed to prevent a person to enjoy his constitutional right. In
this case a bankrupt seek a court’s order that to travel overseas is a fundamental right of
Malaysian citizens. The Federal Court held that Constitution is silent on the right to travel
abroad. The court was in opinion that Article 5 of the Malaysian Federal Constitution
does not confer on the citizen a fundamental right to leave the country; the Government
may stop a person from leaving the country if, for instance, there are criminal charges
pending against him. In the most recent case of Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan
v Victoria Jayaseele Martin [2016] 2 MLJ 309, the Federal Court upheld that the funda-
mental right under Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution is not absolute and this right
can be taken away by law duly passed by the Parliament. In this case the Federal Court
reinstated the decision of the High Court that Rule 10 of the Syariah Lawyers Rule 1993
is not unconstitutional and did not contravene Article 5 on the right to life and liberty
enshrined under the Federal Constitution. While in Singapore, section 131(1)(b) of Bank-
ruptcy Act 1955 (BA 1955) says a bankrupt upon failing to obtain his discharge is unable
to leave, remain or reside outside Singapore without the previous permission of the Offi-
cial Assignee (OA). Meanwhile in the UK under section 358 of Insolvency Act 1986 (IA
1986) it is considered as an offence if the undischarged bankrupt leaves England and
Wales, or attempts to or makes preparations to leave and has in his/her possession prop-
erty which is worth more than the prescribed limit (which the current amount is £1,000).
Further, the effect of undischarged bankrupt in the UK in form of restrictions can be
found in insolvency legislations. The restrictions also embrace the limitation imposed on
individuals who are subjected to Business Restriction Orders (BRO) and Business
Restriction Undertakings (BRU). See further discussion 5.1.1 below on those restrictions.
Meanwhile, section 390(4) of the IA 1986 prohibits the undischarged bankrupt to act as
an insolvency practitioner. Moreover, section 427 of the IA 1986 provides that a debtor
who is adjudged bankrupt is incapable of being elected to or of sitting or voting in the
House of Commons, or on any committee thereof, until the adjudication is annulled, or
until he obtains his discharge from the court. See further 5.1.1 for discussion on BRO
and BRU.
7It has been pointed out that historically, stigma associated with bankrupts arose ‘since
the debtor’s conduct leading up to the declaration of bankruptcy, was deemed to deviate
from traditionally accepted social norms’. R Efrat, ‘The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma’
(2006) 7(2) TIL 368. See below.
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problems such as creditor harassment and social stigma.8 Discharge allows the
debtor to avoid creditor harassment as it prohibits the latter from taking further
action for the discharged debts. Other than being a relief from creditor harass-
ment, discharge also serves as a mode of rehabilitation of debtors. It has been
argued that ‘discharge’ is a great privilege in that without it the debtor would
remain liable forever on debts, which will frequently have reached an unmanage-
able size.9 Discharge allows the debtor to have a fresh start, which is seen as a
form of rehabilitation.10
This paper examines discharge as a form of rehabilitation as recommended
by the International Association of Restructuring, Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Professionals (INSOL), United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) and the World Bank. Then the discussion resumes with a compar-
ative analysis of the law and practice regarding discharge in bankruptcy in
Malaysia, the UK, and Singapore.
2. Principles of personal bankruptcy law
Personal insolvency issues attracted international attention just like corporate
insolvency. In fact, concerns were raised about the social impact of personal
over-indebtedness on families and communities just like concerns over the
impact of business insolvency on society.11 International institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and UNCITRAL have all
8The bankruptcy law for individuals in E&W has its roots in the earlier days of common
law when there was neither a formal system for any collective form of execution and
sharing of expenses among the creditors, nor the means to find out about the status of the
debtor’s assets, resulting in the rule of ‘first come, first served (Cork Report: Report of
the Review Committee, Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd 8558, 1982)) para 31. The
law has been described as ‘stark and uncompromising’ and indeed insolvency was
regarded as an offence little less criminal than a felony. Ibid., Cork Report, para 3. It has
been pointed out that the law remaining ‘very much creditor-oriented’, and it was not
until the eighteen century that the idea of rehabilitation was acknowledged by the Statute
of 4 Anne (E&W) in 1705, where the law introduced the relief of bankrupts through the
concept of discharge from liability of existing debts for those who co-operate with their
creditors. Ibid., para 37. Such bankruptcy legislation was confined to traders on the
assumption that a trader could, through accident or misfortune, become insolvent, but a
private individual could only become insolvent because of his or her doings and this state
of law remained for centuries. Accordingly, non-traders who were insolvent continued to
suffer due to the severity of the individual action. It was only with the enactment of
Bankruptcy Act 1861 that the distinction between traders and non-traders was finally
abolished, thus all debtors, regardless of whether they are traders or non-traders, are eligi-
ble to apply for bankruptcy protection under the law. See further See RM Goode, The
Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1997) 6–7;
V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspective and Principles (Sweet & Maxwell,
2002) 10 and R Efrat, ‘The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma’ (2006) 7(2) TIL 365–93.
9A Keay and P Walton, Insolvency Law: Corporate & Personal (Jordans, London, 2008)
23.
10Ibid.
11D McKenzie Skene and A Walters, ‘Consuming Passions: Benchmarking Consumer
Bankruptcy Law Systems’ in Paul J Omar (ed), International Insolvency Law (Ashgate
Publishing Ltd, Surrey, 2008) 135.
4 R. Azmi et al.
developed their own benchmarks against domestic insolvency systems which
may be appraised.12
The concern led UNCITRAL to publish ‘Legislative Guide on Insolvency
Law’ (‘Guide’)13 to help the establishment of an efficient and effective legal
framework to address debtor’s financial difficulty. UNCITRAL hopes that the
Guide will assist national authorities and legislative bodies in the preparation of
new bankruptcy laws and regulations or reviewing the adequacy of existing laws
and regulations.14
UNCITRAL is of the view that an insolvency regime needs to focus not only
on addressing the administration of debtor’s failure but also on facilitating a fresh
start for insolvent debtors. This can be achieved by helping the debtor to clear
his financial situation and taking other steps to reduce the stigma associated with
business failure. Insolvency law should remove unnecessary conditions and
restrictions on discharge. Moreover, there is a need to encourage banks and the
wider community to take a different view of business failure and provide assis-
tance and support to those involved.15 At the same time, the insolvency law
needs to protect the public and commercial community from debtors whose con-
duct of their financial affairs has been irresponsible, reckless or dishonest.16
Meanwhile, the World Bank has formed the World Bank’s Insolvency and Credi-
tor/Debtor Regimes Task Force in 2011 which, later on, has come out with the
‘Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons’.17 The report
among others discussed the purpose and characteristics of discharge for individ-
ual bankrupt.18 Prior to UNCITRAL and World Bank, INSOL had established
the INSOL Consumer Debt Committee which emphasized the provision of some
form of discharge of indebtedness, rehabilitation or ‘fresh start’ for the debtor.19
The three bodies, UNCITRAL, Task Force, and INSOL, agreed that although
approaches to insolvency/bankruptcy law varied from one country to another,
effective insolvency systems should be able to offer individual debtors a dis-
charge from indebtedness as a method of concluding a bankruptcy procedure.
The following discussions are derived from the recommendations of the Guide,
Task Force, and INSOL Committee on the principle and characteristics of
discharge.
12Ibid.
13(UNCITRAL, 2005) also published at <www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insol
vency/2004Guide.html> accessed 22 May 2016.
14Ibid.
15Furthermore, the report stated the provisions regarding discharge of a natural person in
various countries or jurisdictions are differed for instance they have different period to
have discharge and nature of being adjudicated bankrupt. Ibid.
16Ibid.
17World Bank Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task Force also published at
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGILD/Resources/WBInsolvencyOfNaturalPer
sonsReport_01_11_13.pdf> accessed 22 May 2016.
18Working Group on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Person also published at
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/668381468331807627/pdf/771700WP0WB0In
00Box377289B00PUBLIC0.pdf> accessed 22 May 2016.
19INSOL International’s Consumer Debt Report-Report of Findings and Recommenda-
tions (May, 2001) also published at <https://www.insol.org/pdf/consdebt.pdf> accessed 22
May 2016.
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2.1. Fresh start
One of the principal purposes of an insolvency system for an individual debtor –
a natural person – is to enable him to be finally discharged from debts and there-
fore providing a fresh start.20 It is a key element of any personal insolvency law
or rehabilitation procedure, based on the principle that it is in the society’s inter-
est that a person should be given an opportunity to start afresh, free from past
financial obligations. It has been pointed out that a fresh start will help in the re-
establishment of the debtor’s economic capability, in other words, economic
rehabilitation.21
Discharge and rehabilitation are connected because the latter may work if:
firstly, the debtor is free from excessive debt.22 A straight discharge of debt that
provides an immediate and unconditional fresh start for the debtor is said to be
the most effective form of relief.23 However, many insolvency systems reject the
notion of a straight discharge but require a repayment plan.24 In these systems, a
discharge may happen after the creditor has received a certain amount of pay-
ment based on that plan.25
Secondly, the debtor is treated on an equal basis with non-debtors after a dis-
charge.26 It has been emphasized that the principle of non-discrimination is an
important consideration in achieving the full benefit of a discharge.27 However, if
an insolvency filing is reflected among other ‘negative’ credit entries, even for a
limited number of years following the conclusion of an insolvency case, there will
be discrimination against the debtor who has undergone insolvency procedures.28
Finally, debtor’s change of attitudes concerning proper credit use is also
another factor in a successful rehabilitation process.29 In an attempt to stop the
debtor from becoming excessively indebted in the future, many insolvency sys-
tems offer education and training on the healthy and responsible use of credit.30
Nevertheless, the extents to which the debtor’s attitudes have changed after being
discharged in bankruptcy are much more difficult to achieve or measure. These
weaknesses may hinder the rehabilitation effort since the effectiveness of the
education and training provided to the debtor is hard to be evaluated and
improved if necessary.31
20(UNCITRAL, 2005) also published at <www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insol
vency/2004Guide.html> accessed 22 May 2015, World Bank Insolvency and Creditor/
Debtor Regimes Task Force also published at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTGILD/Resources/WBInsolvencyOfNaturalPersonsReport_01_11_13.pdf> assessed 22
May 2015 and INSOL International’s Consumer Debt Report-Report of Findings and
Recommendations (May, 2001) published at <https://www.insol.org/pdf/consdebt.pdf>
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2.2. Scope and extent of discharge
Effective rehabilitation requires a discharge that covers as many debts as possible
including debts which exist at the beginning of the proceedings and at the time
of discharge.32 The more debts excluded from the effect of the discharge, the less
effective the rehabilitation is.33 Nevertheless, there are debts that may be
excluded from the discharge, due to important social or economic considerations.
Among these excepted debts are child and spouse support, fines, and other sanc-
tions, taxes, and educational loans. Still, where the insolvency law provides that
certain debts are excluded from a discharge, it is advisable that those debts
should be kept to a minimum in order to facilitate the debtor’s fresh start and be
clearly set forth in the insolvency law.34
The insolvency law may specify that the discharge may not apply until after
the expiration of a specified period of time following commencement, during
which period the debtor is expected to cooperate with the insolvency representa-
tive.35 Upon the expiration of such time period, the debtor may be discharged
where the debtor has not acted fraudulently and has cooperated with the insol-
vency representative in performing its obligations under the insolvency law. On
the other hand, the discharge is to be revoked where it was obtained fraudu-
lently.36
In line with the underlying purpose of the insolvency law of encouraging
entrepreneurial activity and risk-taking, an unfortunate but honest and coopera-
tive debtor who has performed its obligations under the insolvency law can be
discharged after liquidation with minimal restrictions.37 Therefore, imposing con-
ditions and restrictions might be more appropriate in cases where the debtor has
not been honest, has not cooperated with the insolvency representative or per-
formed its obligations under the insolvency law or, in more extreme cases, has
been guilty of criminal misconduct.38 It should be emphasized that restrictions or
conditions imposed on a discharged bankrupt, such as restriction from becoming
a director of the company, leaving the country or carrying on a business for a
certain period of time, are intended to regulate the debtor–creditor relationship so
the debtor cannot simply escape from liability and responsibility. Although these
restrictions may be for the good of the debtor, they should not restrict the debtor
in his fresh start.39
The discussions by UNCITRAL, World Bank, and INSOL Committee appear
to reveal what the basic aims or principles of a good and efficient insolvency
system might be or how such system might be formulated. It can be seen that
the role of personal insolvency/bankruptcy law should be, among others, (i) to
offer the individual debtor a discharge from indebtedness; (ii) to specify the dura-
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culpable bankrupts. As mentioned previously, approaches by countries to per-
sonal insolvency law is varied. An assessment of such laws in three Common-
wealth jurisdictions – Malaysia, the UK, and Singapore – should be able to
reveal how the law is developed. Accordingly, the following discussion will
examine the law and practice of discharge in bankruptcy for Malaysia, the UK,
and Singapore.
3. Discharge of bankrupt in Malaysia
In Malaysia, a bankrupt is governed by the Bankruptcy Act 1967 (‘BA 1967’)
and the Bankruptcy Rules 1969 (‘BR 1969’) which are modelled on English
Bankruptcy laws. Basically, Malaysian BA 1967 deals with the entire process by
which an individual is made bankrupt, and the administration of his estate.40 The
BA 1967 provides three alternatives in discharging bankrupt:
(a) discharge of bankrupt by court order under section 33(1),
(b) discharge of bankrupt by the Director General of Insolvency (DGI)’s cer-
tificate under section 33A,
(c) discharge of bankrupt by the annulment of an adjudication order under
section 105.
It is interesting to note that prior to the insertion of section 33A into the BA
1967,41 the power to discharge a bankrupt was vested in the court. The court
may in exercising its discretionary power annul the bankruptcy order or dis-
charge the bankrupt by court order.42 Prior to an amendment to the BA 1967 via
the Bankruptcy (Amendment) Act 2003, the head of the Department of Insol-
vency who is now known as the DGI was formerly known as Official Assignee
(OA).
The discussion on discharge will start with discharge by order of the court,
then followed by a discussion on discharge by DGI’s certificate and finally,
discharge by court’s annulment will be explained.
3.1. Discharge of bankrupt by court order
Section 33 of the BA 1967 provides for a discharge by the Court. However, in
the exercise of its discretion under section 33, the court must have regard to the
following factors:
(a) Public interest and commercial morality.
(b) The interest of the bankrupt and his creditors.
(c) The bankrupt’s conduct prior to and during his bankruptcy.
(d) Whether the bankrupt has committed any offence under the Act.
40Lee Mei Pheng and IJ Detta, Business Law (Oxford University, Malaysia 2014) 321–4.
41See further Section 3.2 ‘Discharge by certificate of DGI’.
42F Lee, ‘Termination of Bankruptcy’ The Malayian Bar (2006). Also published at
<http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/civil_procedure/termination_of_bankruptcy.html>
accessed 22 August 2016.
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(e) Whether the bankrupt has committed an offence under sections 421–424
of the Penal Code.
(f) Whether the bankrupt has done any of the acts specified under section 33
(6) of the BA 1967.
In the exercise of its discretion under section 33, the court was bound to have
regarded not only to the interest of the bankrupt or of the creditors alone, but
also the interest of the public, and of commercial morality. A discharge may be
refused where the bankrupt has been guilty of misconduct in a trade (although
not guilty of any specific offences mentioned in section 33 of BA 1967).43 In
Public Bank v Choong Yew Wah,44 the court held that it must be sensitive to the
public perception of bankruptcy law in the country and indeed the interest of the
bankrupt as an individual. The court added that the interest of the public and
commercial reality at large must be weighed up for the simple reason that society
at large must not have the impression that being a bankrupt is not a serious mat-
ter.
According to section 33(1) BA 1967, the bankrupt may apply to the court for
an order of discharge at any time after the bankruptcy order has been made and
the court shall appoint a day for the hearing of the application. Notice of the
appointment by the court of the day for hearing the application for discharge
shall be published within 14 days before the hearing date to each creditor who
has proved and the court shall hear the DGI and also the creditor.45
In addition, the court may consider the age of the bankrupt, the duration of
bankruptcy, the reasons of being adjudicated bankrupt and whether the bankrupt
is blameworthy, or blameworthiness in the incurring of his debts, the magnitude
of the deficiency in the bankruptcy estate (i.e. the value of the bankrupt’s assets
against his total liabilities), the size or number of creditors, protests to the appli-
cation for the bankrupt to be released, the bankrupt’s domestic, social and finan-
cial circumstances and contributions made by the bankrupt for the benefit of his
creditors.46 In the case of Public Bank v Kok Lee Wah,47 the court rendered an
absolute discharge when some debts were still unpaid. Suriyadi J held that the
bankruptcy was brought about by circumstances beyond the bankrupt’s control
and the unfortunate factor which was instrumental for the debtor’s misfortune
should not be held against her but should instead be viewed as a plus factor in
her attempt to get back on her feet. In the case of Lim Tee Keong v HLG Securi-
ties Sdn. Bhd,48 the application for discharge was made pursuant to section 33 of
the BA 1967 but was dismissed. Then the bankrupt made an appeal against the
dismissal of his application. The issues to be considered before the Court of
Appeal included, among others, whether the High Court Judge was correct to
insist that the bankrupt came up with 50% dividend before he could get a dis-
charge. The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that the decision to discharge a
43Lim Hun Swee v Malaysia British Assurance Bhd. & Ors And Other Appeals [2010] 8
CLJ 680.
44[2014] 5 CLJ 695.
45Section 33(9).
46F Lee (n 42).
47[2004] 4 MLJ 433.
48[2016] 4 CLJ 840.
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bankrupt from a bankruptcy is an exercise of discretion by a judge. Besides, in
considering whether or not to grant the discharge, the court said it has to balance
two conflicting concerns; firstly, it is undesirable to discharge a bankrupt who
has brought his or her bankruptcy by dishonest business dealings and has con-
ducted the business affairs to the detriment of his or her creditors. Secondly, it
would be in the interest and commercial morality that people who have become
bankrupt through little of their fault be given a second chance in life. The court
was of the opinion that the DGI report was incomplete and indeed the non-com-
pliance of the bankrupt to file his statement of affairs within 21 days, as required
under section 16(2) of the BA 1967, as well as the explanation why was that
dividend offered to the creditors keep falling from time to time were not ade-
quately addressed by the DGI in his report. The court then held that the High
Court was correct to insist that the bankrupt came up with the 55% dividend
because the bankrupt had committed an offence under the BA 1967 for failing to
file his statement of affairs within 21 days after the Receiving Order was ordered
as required under section 16(3) of the BA 1967. The court decided to dismiss
the appeal for discharge.
It has been pointed that if the bankrupt is discharged by court order, the
reports of the DGI are prima facie evidence for the court to exercise his discre-
tion.49 At the hearing of the application, the courts shall take into account a
report of the DGI as to the bankrupt’s conduct and affairs including a report as
to the bankrupt’s conduct under his bankruptcy. Accordingly, the DGI must play
his/her role effectively and with care. The DGI cannot simply escape from his
duty to investigate by saying that he is powerless or merely rely on someone’s
statement without any further investigation. Therefore the order granted to dis-
charge a bankrupt while there is no said report or where the report from DGI
was incomplete would become null and void.50
It can be seen in the case of Re Lau Kah Lay & Tang Kuong Tiew; Ex P
Cold Storage (Malaysia) Bhd,51 where the discharge order was void where it
was not supported by the report from the OA (as DGI was formerly known) or
where the report from OA was incomplete. The court held that the OA carried
the onerous task of ensuring that a bankrupt has no hidden assets stashed away
whether in his name or in the name of his wife or children. It can be seen that
without proper investigation towards the bankrupt’s estate or the wife of the
bankrupt, it will give an impression to the public that bankruptcy is not a serious
matter for them since they still can easily borrow money and escape from repay-
ing the money as they still can enjoy using the money even after declared bank-
rupt.
Similarly, in the case of Lim Hun Swee v Malaysia British Assurance Bhd. &
Ors,52 if in the court’s view the report of the DGI is considered as incomplete,
the court is not bound to accept it. The requirement for the DGI report under dis-
charge by court order is mandatory. Without a proper or complete report by the
DGI, the court cannot decide on the issue of discharge. The purpose of the DGI
49F Lee (n 42), see also section 33(8) of BA 1967.
50Ibid.
51[2001] 3 CLJ 960.
52[2010] 8 CLJ 680.
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report is to secure a full and complete investigation and disclosure of all the
material facts or information relating to the bankruptcy.
The importance of the DGI report was further affirmed in the case of Public
Bank v Chong Yew Wah,53 whereby the court upheld that the DGI report played
an important part in discharging a bankrupt in order for the court to exercise its
discretion. If the report of the DGI was found to be lacking in details or reason-
able justifications, the court was duty-bound to ignore it and could not allow the
bankrupt to take advantage of such deficiencies.
Other than the failure of the DGI to prepare a complete report, the decision
to award the discharge might be varied if it is proven to the satisfaction of the
court that the bankrupt has committed an offence under the Act or under any
written law repealed by the Act or under section 421 to 424 of the Penal Code.
In such cases, the court shall determine either by refusing the discharge or sus-
pend the operation of the order until a dividend of not less than 50% has been
paid to the creditors unless there are special reasons.54
3.2. Discharges by certificate of DGI
According to section 33A (1) of the BA 1967, DGI has a discretionary power to
issue a certificate discharging a bankrupt from bankruptcy. However, the certifi-
cate can only be issued after a five-year lapse since the date of receiving order
and adjudication order was made. Previously, such discretionary power of the
DGI to issue a certificate required DGI to give his reason to discharge a bank-
rupt. However, it should be noted that when the BA 1967 was amended in 2003
to keep up to date with international changes in the law relating to insolvency,
as it was considered being complex previously, the requirement for DGI to give
his reason for discharging a bankrupt has been waived. Accordingly, DGI is only
allowed to give notice to the creditors about his intention to discharge a bankrupt
from bankruptcy without having to give any reason.55 Section 33B(1) of BA
1967 placed the burden on the creditors to file a proof why the bankrupt should
not be discharged. The new section 33B(1) was introduced since the creditors
were not satisfied with the reasons given in discharging by DGI that caused a
number of cases of bankruptcy since 1980’s are still pending even though there
is no assets of the bankrupt that can be realized.56
Although the requirement of DGI to give a reason for discharging a bankrupt
has been waived, the creditors still have the right to object the issuing of the cer-
tificate of the discharge. Furthermore, the creditor’s objection must be made
within 21 days from the date of the notice to discharge a bankrupt is served on
him and the creditor must state the ground for his objection in his notice of
objection and submit it to DGI.57 DGI then shall within 21 days give a notice to
the creditor to inform the rejection towards the creditor’s objection while the
53[2014] 5 CLJ 695.
54Lim Tee Keong v HLG Securities Sdn. Bhd [2016] 4 CLJ 460 See also section 33 (4)
and 33 (6) of the BA 1967.
55G Radhakrishna, ‘Rethingking Insolvency Laws In Malaysian Context’ JSAR (2012).
56RA Abdullah, ‘Recent Development on Insolvency Laws and Business Rehabilitation –
National and Cross Border Issues’ (2003) Department of Official Assignee Malaysia.
57Section 33B(3) of BA 1967.
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creditor has the right to bring his objection application before the court to disal-
low DGI from issuing a certificate of discharge as provided under section 33B(4)
of BA 1967. Nevertheless, before making any order to dismiss the creditor’s
objection or disallow DGI from issuing a certificate of discharge for a period not
exceeding two years, the court shall hear from DGI and the bankrupt.58
In the case of Re Rajangam Marimuthu Mudalliar; Ex P Parkash Singh
Wasawa Singh,59 the court upheld the decision of DGI to give a certificate of
discharge to the bankrupt by considering that DGI had administered the bank-
rupt’s estate for more than 10 years, that the bankrupt was then already 58 years
old, that the judgment debt amounted to less than RM10,000, and that it was no
longer possible to collect further contributions since the bankrupt had gone miss-
ing and was untraceable. In rejecting the creditor’s objection to the certificate of
discharge granted by the DGI to the bankrupt, the court held that DGI has done
all that he could and all that was necessary to administer the estate of the bank-
rupt and trace the bankrupt. In considering the age, education, background and
employment of the bankrupt, it would serve no purpose to further prolong his
bankruptcy. Furthermore, it was held that the object of BA 1967 was not to pun-
ish the bankrupt for his failure to comply with the terms of the judgment sum
and nor was the Department of Insolvency created to act as the creditor’s debt
collector. It was against the public policy to maintain a person as a bankrupt for
his entire life without any way out when there is no rational justification to do
so.
3.3. Discharge by court’s annulment
Under section 105(1) of BA 1967, the bankruptcy order may be annulled under
several circumstances, which include; if the bankrupt has made a full payment of
his debts or if the bankrupt’s offer of composition or scheme of arrangement has
been accepted by creditors and approved by the court.60 The court, in the case of
Omar Khayam Enterprise v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd,61 has defined the word ‘an-
nul’ as ‘to declare invalid’ or ‘to cancel’ and/or ‘abolish’. The court was in the
opinion that where the annulment is granted, the effect of the annulment was as
if the debtor was never bankrupt.
Usually, the court will grant an order for annulment when it involved a tech-
nical ground for example where the calculation of interest of the debts was inac-
curate. In the case of Hasnah Che Hasan v Hong Kong Bank Malaysia Bhd,62
the bankrupt appealed to annul the bankruptcy order to be granted, claiming that
the calculation of interest in the bankruptcy notice was inaccurate. The court held
that there was miscalculation in the interest and that the interest claimed in the
bankruptcy notice was more than the amount due; thus the bankruptcy notice
was therefore a nullity. In Bungsar Hill Holdings Sdn Bhd v Dr Amir Farid
58Section 33B(6) of BA 1967.
59[2010] 3 CLJ 858; [2009] 1 LNS 1043.
60Fiona Lee, ‘Termination of Bankruptcy’ The Malayian Bar (2006).
61[2010] 4 MLJ 285.
62[2009] 1 LNS 481.
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Datuk Isahak,63 the annulment of bankruptcy order did not cover only technical
defects like defective service of the bankruptcy notice but was wider and covered
other ‘legal grounds’, which may include the ability of a debtor to pay debts. In
this case, since the respondent was able to pay his debt, the court considered it
was a legal ground for the court to annul the bankruptcy order under section 105
of BA 1967. Meanwhile, in the case of Ting Nguk Yong v Bank Utama (Malay-
sia) Bhd,64 the court disallowed a bankrupt to be discharged since the agreement
to pay Ringgit Malaysia (RM) 500,000.00 in a full settlement total of the debts;
i.e. RM 1,500,000.00 was not valid. Similarly, in the case of Kwong Yik Bank
Bhd v Hah Chiew Yin Yin,65 the application for annulment was not granted since
the respondent (bankrupt) had failed to satisfy that the debt lawfully due to the
appellant had been paid in full in cash.
3.4. The calls to review Malaysian bankruptcy law on discharging bankrupt
It was mentioned earlier that the Malaysian government was urged to review
bankruptcy laws to provide more options for rehabilitation rather than declaring
the debtor as a bankrupt. After about five years of being urged to review bank-
ruptcy laws, in 2015, the Department of Insolvency proposed a reform of Malay-
sian BA 1967.66 Among others, the proposal included the promotion of a second
chance to the bankrupt where the bankrupt would be discharged after five years
from the date of bankruptcy order was made, only if the bankrupt had paid at
least 50% of the debts provable in bankruptcy, fulfilled all the conditions
imposed on a bankrupt under BA 1967 and obeyed all the instructions given by
DGI.67 Under the new proposal, the right of the bankrupt to be discharged is still
subject to the creditor’s objection. The bankrupt will be freely discharged if there
is no objection from the creditors. However, if there is an objection, the dis-
charged will be dealt with as a discharged by court order. Upon hearing the
objection the court may accept it and refuse to discharge the bankrupt or reject
the creditors’ objection and allow the bankrupt to be discharged with or without
conditional discharge. The discharge may subject to any condition with respect
to any earnings or income which may become due to the bankrupt after the dis-
charged, or his after-acquired property, and the payment of the debts which is
unpaid after the date of the discharged.68
With regards to the conditional discharge, it may be rescinded by the court if
the bankrupt fails to make a full declaration of his assets in the statement of
affairs and does not cooperate with DGI. Being discharged will not release a
bankrupt from any debts which were not declared in the bankrupt’s statement of
affairs and incurred for the maintenance of a family or arising under any order
made in a family proceeding. Moreover, the discharge will not relieve the debtor
632005] 2 CLJ 809.
64[1999] 1 CLJ 173.
65[1985] 2 MLJ 452.
66A Proposal to Reform Bankruptcy Act 1967, Department of Insolvency – Public Con-
sultation (2015) 1–85 <http://www.mdi.gov.my/index.php/about-us/proposed-reform-of-
the-bankruptcy-act> accessed 22 August 2016.
67Ibid.
68Ibid.
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of debts due to the government, debts incurred after a bankruptcy order was
made, or debts relating to benefit overpayment, liability to pay damages in
respect of personal injuries to any person or property of the person, and liability
to pay damages arising from negligence; i.e. accident.69
Despite a proposal to reform the specific provision on the methods of dis-
charging a bankrupt being presented in April 2015, no automatic discharge was
included or proposed in the reform proposal. Accordingly, Malaysians were
caught by surprised by the news that the new Bankruptcy (Amendment) Bill
2016 (Bill 2016) was tabled on 21 November 2016 in Parliament for its First
Reading, that the Bill introduced, among others, an automatic discharge. It was
reported that a new provision allowed for an automatic discharge of the bank-
ruptcy after three years from submitting his statement of affairs and subject to
achieving the target contribution set by DGI and having rendered an account of
monies and property to the DGI. The creditors can object to the automatic dis-
charge but there are only limited specified grounds they can raise.70 The Bill has
yet been gazetted and there has not been any indication as to when it will come
into force. The Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department stated that the major
changes of the Bill 2016 could significantly reduce the burden on debtors
declared bankrupt due to their own borrowings; as previously, a debtor would
have to wait five years before being able to even apply for a discharge in court.71
It was further argued that upon filing the statement of affairs, a person declared
bankrupt could be discharged after three years so that they can start a new life.72
It is claimed that it will not bring any benefit to make them wait for five years
as the person may not be able to pay the debts even after five years and most of
the time bankrupts will not have anything to pay.73 It has been emphasized that
after they are discharged, any creditors who want to give financial assistance will
be more cautious.74 It seems that Malaysia is trying to emulate Singapore’s pol-
icy on the discharge of bankrupts: Singapore has a similar policy, mainly to save
on public funds borne by the Insolvency Department for the whole process
of discharging a debtor’.75 It can be seen that for some reason, automatic dis-
charge was introduced when the Bill 2016 was tabled in the Malaysian Parlia-
ment last year. As the changes to the law were aimed to give bankrupts an
opportunity to start ‘a new life’, perhaps it is not too exaggerated to say that
such changes to the bankruptcy law may bring better results to the bankrupts,
financial institutions, public, and even the government if the amendments are
carefully studied as well as the approach taken is a coherent scheme of reform
rather than ad hoc reform. Yet, the move to amend the law on the discharge of
69Ibid.
70See further ‘ The New Bankruptcy Bill: The 10 Changes to Bankruptcy Law in Malay-
sia’ <https://themalaysianlawyer.com/2016/11/22/the-new-bankruptcy-bill-malaysia//>
accessed 23 December 2016.
71See further ‘Azalina: Bankruptcy Law Changes to Reduce Debtors’ Burden’ <http://
www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2016/10/28/azalina-bankruptcy-law-changes-
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bankrupt in order to save on public funds borne by the Insolvency Department
for discharge process should be applauded.
4. Discharge of bankrupt in Singapore
In Singapore, the Bankruptcy Act 1995 (BA 1995) came into force on 15 July
1995. Prior to reforms towards BA 1995, the old legislation only provided for a
bankrupt either to be discharged by the court order or annulment by the court.
Only in 1995, discharge by Official Assignee (OA) was inserted in the BA 1995
with rejection towards an automatic discharge.76 The changes aimed to promote
the use of alternatives to bankruptcy, facilitate speedier discharge for bankrupts
in appropriate circumstances and enable bankrupts to continue to be economi-
cally productive during bankruptcy.77 Currently, similar to Malaysia, in Singa-
pore, the BA 1995 allows the bankrupt to be discharged by the court order, OA
(in Malaysia by a certificate of DGI) and court’s annulment.
4.1. Discharge of bankrupt by order of court
An application to be discharged by order of court may be made by OA, the
bankrupt or any other person having an interest in the matter at any time after
the making of the bankruptcy order.78 Every application shall be served on each
creditor who has filed a proof of debt and on OA if he is not the applicant, and
the court shall hear OA and any creditor before making an order of discharge.79
Under this mechanism, it is not possible for bankrupts to be discharged without
getting approval from the court and only after they have paid their debts in full
or proposed a scheme of arrangement which was acceptable to their creditors.80
Therefore, it is not surprising that the application to be discharged by order of
court was hardly made and where the application to be discharged had to be
made by the bankrupt himself, the bankrupt preferred to remain within a bank-
ruptcy since the application involved cumbersome procedures.81
In supporting the regime of easier discharge from bankruptcy, the procedures
of application to be discharged by court order has been made less onerous. For
example, under section 124(2), the application can be made at any time either by
the bankrupt or any other person having interest in the matter and the need for
public examination of the bankrupt was removed.82 In granting a discharge, the
76V Yeo and P Gan, ‘Insolvency Law in Singapore’ in R Tomasic (ed), Insolvency Law
and Practice in East Asia (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2006) 376.
77Report of The Insolvency Law Review Committee Singapore – Final Report (2013)
26–48 also published at <https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/
Revised%20Report%20of%20the%20Insolvency%20Law%20Review%20Committee.pdf>
accessed 22 May 2016.
78Section 124 of BA 1995.
79Section 124(2) of BA 1995.
80SC Mohan, ‘Balancing Competing Interests in Bankruptcy: Discharge by Certificate of
the OA in Singapore’ (2008) 20 SACLJ 464.
81Ibid.
82It should be noted that previously, the application to be discharged by the court order
only can be made after 5 years since the bankruptcy order was made on the bankrupt and
it was mandatory for the bankrupt to go through a public examination.
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court powers are wide either to grant the discharge or not under section 124(3)
of BA 1995. However, the court, in exercising its discretion, must consider not
only the interest of the debtors and creditors but also the public at large and the
applicable law including section 124(4) of BA 1995 which dealt with the
offences committed by a bankrupt.83
In granting a discharge, the court powers are wide. Indeed, the court upon
hearing the application to be discharged may under section 124(3): refuse to dis-
charge the bankrupt from bankruptcy; make an order discharging him absolutely;
or make an order discharging him subject to such conditions as it thinks fit to
impose, including conditions with respect to any income which may be subse-
quently due to him; or any property devolving upon him, or acquired by him,
after his discharge, as may be specified in the order. It has been pointed out84
that the application for a bankrupt to be discharged made under this mechanism
will not be guaranteed granted by the court as it is subjected to the court discre-
tion based on the facts of the cases. In this regard (similar to Malaysian law on
discharge by the court) there are several factors to be taken into consideration by
the court in deciding whether an application for discharge should be granted. In
Jeyaratnam Joshua Benjamin v Indra Krishnan85 it was submitted that the fac-
tors included:
(1) The interests of the bankrupt and creditors;
(2) The public interest and commercial morality;
(3) The bankrupt’s conduct prior to and during his bankruptcy;
(4) Whether the bankrupt has committed any offence under the Bankruptcy
Act, or under sections 421 to 424 of the Penal Code (Cap. 224);
(5) The cause of the bankrupt’s insolvency and his culpability in incurring
his debts;
(6) The magnitude of the deficiency in the bankrupt’s estate;
(7) Any objections to the application;
(8) The bankrupt’s domestic, social, and financial circumstances, including
the bankrupt’s employment status and whether the bankruptcy is affecting
his chances of obtaining gainful employment; and
(9) The contributions made by the bankrupt, for the benefit of the creditors.
Moreover, the consideration to grant discharge application has been stated by
Warren Khoo LJ in Re Siah Ooi Choe,86 as he pointed out that discharge is
given to recognize an individual businessman who becomes insolvent not
through any fault, moral or otherwise, but through just being caught at the wrong
turning of the economic cycle and for the sake of the society’s interest, he should
be given a second chance in life, so that the social cost of waste of entrepreneur-
ial resources could be reduced without failing to give concern and safeguard
83See Report of The Insolvency Law Review Committee Singapore (n 77) 26–48.
84Jeyaratnam Joshua Benjamin v Indra Krishnan [2007] 3 SLR (R) 433; Hong Leong
Bank Bhd v Soh Seow Poh [2009] 4 SLR (R) 525. See further Report of The Insolvency
Law Review Committee Singapore (n 77) 26–48.
85[2007] 3 SLR (R) 433.
86[1998] 1 SLR 903.
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towards dishonest or fraudulent people who conduct their business with intent to
cause detriment to their creditors.
Additionally, under section 124(4), if the court found that the bankrupt has
committed an offence under the BA 199587 or under section 421, 422, 423 or
424 of the Penal Code (Cap. 224), the court shall refuse to discharge the bank-
rupt from bankruptcy or make an order discharging him subject to his paying a
dividend to his creditors of not less than 25% or to the payment of any income
which may be subsequently due to him or with respect to the property devolving
upon him, or acquired by him, after his discharge, as may be specified in the
order and to such other conditions as the court may think fit to impose; or if it is
satisfied that the bankrupt is unable to fulfil any condition attached and if it
thinks fit, make an order discharging the bankrupt subject to such conditions as
the court may think fit to impose.
In the case of Hong Leong Bank Bhd v Soh Seow Poh,88 the power of the
court to grant conditional or unconditional discharge was discussed. In this case,
the decision of the court to grant an unconditional discharge under section 124
of BA 1995 to the bankrupt was challenged. It was argued that the bankrupt had
committed an offence under the Bankruptcy Act by transferring assets to a credi-
tor shortly before he is going into bankruptcy and the court shall not grant
unconditional discharged to him since section 124(4)(c) only allow for a condi-
tional discharge. The court decided that it has a great degree of discretion in
87A bankrupt is said as committed an offence under section 124(4) that might affect his
approval to be discharged under the following circumstances:(a) that the bankrupt has
omitted to keep such books of accounts as would sufficiently disclose his business trans-
actions and financial position within the 3 years immediately preceding his bankruptcy, or
within such shorter period immediately preceding that event as the court may consider
reasonable in the circumstances;(b) that the bankrupt has continued to trade after knowing
or having reason to believe himself to be insolvent;(c) that the bankrupt has contracted
any debt provable in the bankruptcy without having at the time of contracting it any rea-
sonable ground of expectation (proof whereof shall lie on him) of being able to pay it;(d)
that the bankrupt has brought on or contributed to his bankruptcy by rash speculations or
extravagance in living, or by recklessness, or want of reasonable care and attention to his
business and affairs;(e) that the bankrupt has delayed or put any of his creditors to unnec-
essary expense by a frivolous or vexatious defense to any action or other legal proceed-
ings properly brought or instituted against him;(f) that the bankrupt has within 3 months
preceding the date of the bankruptcy order, when unable to pay his debts as they became
due, given an undue preference to any of his creditors;(g) that the bankrupt has, in Singa-
pore or elsewhere on any previous occasion, been adjudged bankrupt or made a composi-
tion or arrangement with his creditors;(h) that the bankrupt has been guilty of any fraud
or fraudulent breach of trust;(i) that the bankrupt has, within 3 months immediately pre-
ceding the date of the bankruptcy order, sent goods out of Singapore under circumstances
which afford reasonable grounds for believing that the transaction was not a bona fide
commercial transaction;(j) that the bankrupt’s assets are not of a value equal to 20% of
the amount of his unsecured liabilities, unless he satisfies the court that the fact that the
assets are not of a value equal to 20% of his unsecured liabilities has arisen from circum-
stances for or in respect of which he cannot firstly be held blamable;(k) that the bankrupt
has entered into a transaction with any person at an undervalue within the meaning of
section 98;(l) that the bankrupt has given an unfair preference to any person within the
meaning of section 99; and(m)that the bankrupt has made a general assignment to another
person of his book debts within the meaning of section 104.
88[2009] 4 SLR 525; [2009] SGCA 37.
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imposing conditions in granting a discharge. The phrase ‘subject to such condi-
tions as the court may think fit to impose’ would conceivably include the possi-
bility of not imposing any conditions if there were no appropriate conditions in
mind of the court. In addition, there was no proof regarding the bankrupt’s
offence. Yet the court may, at any time before an order of discharge takes effect,
rescind or vary the order.89 It has been argued that this was the reason why there
was very little incentive for a bankrupt to seek a discharge by contributing to his
bankruptcy estate for the benefit of his creditors or to obtain the help of his
friends and relatives to do so, which caused the number of bankrupt increased.90
4.2. Discharges by certificate of OA
Discharge by OA was introduced in 1995 due to the problems under the old law
which had weaknesses in the discharge mechanism that caused the undischarged
bankrupt to remain within the bankruptcy regime almost indefinitely until his
application to be discharged was approved by the court.91 The OA may, in his
discretion and subject to section 126, issue a certificate discharging a bankrupt
from bankruptcy after a period of three years has lapsed since the date of com-
mencement of the bankruptcy, and the debts which have been proven in bank-
ruptcy do not exceed $500,000, or such other sum as may be prescribed.92
Although discharge by a certificate of OA is seen as an easier discharge,
there were concerns on such discharge about the fairness of OA in deciding
whether to discharge a bankrupt or not.93 In responding to this issue, the Insol-
vency and Public Trustee Office has issued a ‘Guide to the Bankruptcy Act
1995’. The Guide laid down several factors that OA would consider including94:
(i) The grounds or reasons of the bankruptcy,
(ii) The duration of the bankruptcy,
(iii) The bankrupt assets and payments to his bankruptcy account,
(iv) The bankrupt behaviour, and
(v) The level of bankrupt’s co-operation given to OA in the administration
of his affairs.
Sections 125 and 126 of BA 1995 were well explained in the case of Re Ng
Lai Wat; OA v Housing and Development Board.95 The court, in this case, held
that the word ‘may’ in section 125 and section 126 was used in a ‘permissive
sense’ and hence the discretion of both the court and OA completely unfettered.
Section 126 of the Act does not contain qualifying words to the effect that the
court can interfere with OA’s decision only if the decision is unreasonable.
89Section 124(6) of BA 1995.
90SC Mohan (n 80) 464.
91Ibid.
92Section 125(1)(2) of BA 1995.
93SC Mohan (n 80) 464.
94Insolvency and Public Trustee’s Office [Singapore 1999] 2nd Edition, 4. See also SC
Mohan (n 80).
95[1996] 3 SLR 106: See also SC Mohan (n 80).
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Once the discharge has been made, the notice of it shall be given to the
Registrar and be published in the Gazette and advertised in any local newspa-
per.96 Furthermore, OA shall, upon the application of a bankrupt or his creditor
or another interested person, issue to the applicant a copy of the certificate of
discharge upon the payment of the prescribed fee.97
Nevertheless, the issuing of the certificate is subjected to the creditor’s objec-
tion. Therefore, under section 126(1) of the BA 1995, OA shall serve on each
creditor who has filed a proof of debt a notice of his intention to discharge the
bankrupt together with a statement of his reasons for wanting to do so. A credi-
tor may, within 21 days from the said notice given by OA, furnish a statement of
the grounds of his objection to OA.98 If he fails to furnish it, he shall be deemed
to have no objection to the discharge.99 Also, if the objection was rejected by
OA, the creditors may make an application to the court for an order prohibiting
OA from issuing a certificate within 21 days of being informed of his objec-
tion.100
On an application made under section 126(4), the court may dismiss the cred-
itor’s application or postpone the granting of the certificate not exceeding
2 years; or make an order permitting the OA to issue a certificate discharging the
bankrupt but subject to such conditions as the court may think fit to impose, if it
thinks it is just and expedient under section 126(5). It is believed that the dis-
charge by OA has worked well in practice and indeed the success went beyond
all expectations,101 as illustrated by the following results: (i) low creditor objec-
tion as OA was choosing people who are truly deserving a discharge; (ii) the
high rates of discharge; (iii) benefits for creditors from dividend payments; (iv)
assistance being offered to bankrupt through Employment Assistance
Scheme (EASE).102 EASE was established by OA in order to help unemployed
bankrupts to get employed. Also, it is aimed at changing the mind sets of both
creditors and bankrupts whereby as the bankrupts feel motivated to contribute to
their bankruptcy estate, the creditors, in turn, are willing to accept settlement
offers and are generally less resistant to discharge.103Although the reforms to dis-
charge by a certificate of OA have been successfully implemented, there were
arguments that the current balance of interests between bankrupts and creditors
may need to be appraised.104
96Section 125(3) of BA 1995.
97Section 125(4) of BA 1995.
98Section 126(2) of BA 1995.
99Section 126(3) of BA 1995.
100Section 126(4) of BA 1995.
101SC Mohan (n 80).
102EASE was set up with assistance from the Ministry of Manpower, National Trades
Union Congress, NTUC Income E-Ads, Community Development Councils, Private
Employment Agencies and multinational companies. EASE required bankrupts who
claimed to be unemployed and hence unable to make regular payments, to register with
EASE for employment and increase their payment to their bankruptcy estates and thus
expedite their discharges.
103SC Mohan (n 80).
104Insolvency and Public Trustee’s Office [Singapore 1999] 2nd Edition.
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4.3. Annulment of bankruptcy order
Under BA 1995, the annulment of a bankruptcy order may be made whether or
not the bankrupt has been discharged from the bankruptcy.105 In the case of Tan
Teck Guan v Mapletree Trustee Pte Ltd (trustee of Mapletree Industrial Trust),106
the judge held that under Singapore law, annulment, once granted, will wipe out
the bankruptcy altogether as if the order had never been made on the debtor.
In this context, the application to annul the bankruptcy order may be made to
the court under section 123(1). Under the said provision, the court may annul a
bankruptcy order if it appears to the court that:
(a) at the time the order was made, the order ought not to have been made,
(b) both the debts and the expenses of the bankruptcy have all either been
paid or secured for to the satisfaction of the court since the making of
the order,
(c) proceedings are pending in Malaysia for the distribution of the bankrupt’s
estate and effects amongst the creditors under the bankruptcy law of
Malaysia and that the distribution ought to take place there, or
(d) a majority of the creditors in number and value are residents in Malaysia
and that from the situation of the property of the bankrupt or for other
causes his estate and effects ought to be distributed among the creditors
under the bankruptcy law of Malaysia.
Instead of court, an application to annul the bankruptcy order can also be
made to OA under section 123A. OA may issue a certificate annulling a bank-
ruptcy order if it appears to OA that to the extent required by the rules, the debts
which have been proven and the expenses of the bankruptcy have all been paid
since the making of the order.
4.4. Report of the Insolvency Law Review Committee on automatic discharge
In Singapore, there is no automatic discharge of bankrupt. Interestingly though,
the Insolvency Law Review Committee (Singapore) of 2013 discussed this mat-
ter in their Report. It is important to note that in their review of automatic dis-
charge, the Committee referred to automatic discharge regimes found in Hong
Kong, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. The Committee opined that
the justifications for introducing an automatic discharge into these jurisdictions
are107:
(1) The previous discharge regimes were too burdensome to the bankrupts; it
has led to a situation ‘where bankrupts hardly applied for a discharge,
possibly through ignorance or from an unwillingness to put themselves
through further expense and trouble’.108 As a result, a growth increase in
the number of bankrupts; and this is administratively pricey.
105Section 123(2) of BA 1995.
106[2011] SGHC 99.
107Report of The Insolvency Law Review Committee Singapore (n 77) 42–5.
108Ibid., 42.
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(2) It was also observed that ‘a great number of bankrupts are the victims of
misfortune’.109 It is believed that this category of bankrupts should be
discharged with minimum hardship and expense.
(3) Bankruptcy caused by easily obtained credit. A substantial increase in the
availability of personal credit has resulted in a significant growth of con-
sumer bankruptcy cases. Therefore, the Government needs to have ‘ma-
chinery that can deal with such individual’s over-indebtedness in
place’.110
It has been pointed that the ‘Members of the Committee have different views
on whether a regime of automatic discharge should be introduced in Singa-
pore’.111 Accordingly, several justifications have been laid down for rejection of
automatic discharge.112
(1) While a regime of automatic discharge from bankruptcy would help to
periodically clear a number of bankruptcy cases from the system and
therefore contribute to bringing down the costs of bankruptcy administra-
tion, the need for mere administrative efficiency cannot trump the need to
uphold the policy that individuals have to be responsible for their finan-
cial affairs. The disincentive against irresponsible borrower or debtor will
be deteriorated in a regime of automatic discharge. Nevertheless, it can
be reasoned that the proper balance is struck in having a bankrupt only
to be released from his bankruptcy status after being reviewed by OA or
the court to ensure that it is warranted by the circumstances of the case.
(2) The regime of automatic discharge may inspire the filing of bankruptcy
by individual debtors for a speedy release or discharge of their debts with
little or no payment at all and debtors would not really commit to their
financial obligations. This would give impact to the costs of credit, as
creditors would feel that their interests are not being adequately protected.
Ironically, it was noted that Hong Kong experienced an unusual growth
in bankruptcy (0.7% in 1994 to 86% by 2004) after the regime of auto-
matic discharge was introduced, despite a deep-rooted cultural stigma of
bankruptcy. Indeed, in Australia, the number of bankruptcy applications
has also arisen when automatic discharge was reduced from three years
to six months.
(3) The automatic discharge regime may provide less incentive for the bank-
rupts to co-operate with OA in the administration of their estates and dis-
charge of their debts. Indeed, the onus is then placed on the creditors or
the OA to continuously monitor a bankrupt’s affairs and object, if
required, to a bankrupt’s automatic discharge. Accordingly, this would
increase the burden and costs of bankruptcy and its administration on the
state, creditors, and the taxpaying public (instead of the regime of auto-
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It was emphasised that ‘there are valid reasons why automatic discharge may
not be ideal’.113 Finally, no recommendation was made to introduce automatic
discharge by the Committee. Yet it was proposed that the discharge regime can
be reviewed and modified to see if a better balance between the interest of the
bankrupts and the State can be achieved.114
4.5. Amendments of Singapore’s bankruptcy laws proposed
On 11 May 2015, the proposal to discharge first-time bankrupts after seven years
in bankruptcy even though they could not resolve their debts during that period
was tabled by the Law Ministry for the first time in Parliament in response to
the Report of The Insolvency Law (2013). Under the proposed framework, those
who fail to settle the target contribution in full prior to their discharge will have
their records retained permanently on a register that can be accessed by the pub-
lic and this will be maintained by OA. Such measures are taken in order to assist
creditors to make an informed decision when extending credit to this group. Nev-
ertheless, for those who pay the target contribution in full will be removed from
the register five years after discharge.115
5. Discharge of bankrupt in the UK (England and Wales)
Insolvency law in the UK has developed parallel systems for dealing with the
insolvency of individuals (bankruptcy) and corporate. In the UK, bankruptcy is
governed by Part IX of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) and Insolvency Rules
1986. In the UK automatic discharge, Business Restrictions Order (BRO) or
Bankruptcy Restrictions Undertakings (BRU) was introduced thirteen years ago
following the coming into force of the Enterprise Act 2002 and these will be dis-
cussed in the following sections.
5.1. Automatic discharge
The main reform in the UK with regards to discharge from personal bankruptcy
is concerning an automatic discharge. An automatic discharge requires no appli-
cation to be made to the court. Under a new section 279 of IA 1986, a bankrupt
will be discharged one year from the making of the bankruptcy order where that
order was made on or after 1 April 2004 subject to an application being made
by the Official Receiver (OR) or the estate of the bankrupt under section 279(3)
and offences committed by the bankrupt. Previously, the period to be discharged
was three years, which was reduced to one year by the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA
2002). The bankrupt will be discharged without making any application to the
court and released from all debts except for the debts including116:
113Ibid.
114Ibid.
115F Mokhtar, ‘Changes to Bankruptcy Law Proposed’ also available at <www.channel
newsasia.com/news/business/singapore/changes-to-bankruptcy> accessed 22 August 2015.
116L Conway, ‘Discharge from Bankruptcy’ (2013), Library House of Commons Home
Affairs Section.
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(a) any money owed under family court proceedings,
(b) any court fines or debts arising from fraud or certain other crimes,
(c) debts incurred after the bankruptcy order, and
(d) all outstanding student loans for those who made bankrupt before 13
April 2005.
Despite the one year automatic discharge, a bankrupt can also obtain an early
discharge provided that if before the end of the one-year period, the OA files
with the court a notice stating that the investigation of the conduct and affairs of
the bankrupt under section 289 of IA 1986 is unnecessary or concluded. The
bankrupt is then discharged when the notice is filed.117According to section 279
(3) of IA 1986, upon application of the OR or the trustee of a bankrupt’s estate,
the court may order that the period of one year shall cease to run until: (a) the
end of a specified period, or (b) the fulfilment of a specified condition. While
under section 279 (4) of IA 1986, the court may make an order under subsection
(3) only if satisfied that the bankrupt has failed or is failing to comply with an
obligation imposed on him.
It has been pointed out that less burdensome discharge provisions encourage
more responsible lending practices.118 This is due to enhance creditor prudence
brought about by the notion that if a debtor can escape their liabilities with ease,
a creditor will not be simply giving credit to the debtor. The creditor will have
the knowledge, and perhaps disincentive, that the debtor could escape liability
for the debt easily. The creditor will, therefore, lend more cautiously to minimize
the risk of loss. On the other hand, generous discharge provision might lead to
irresponsible borrowing activities by debtors and therefore cause a rise in the
bankrupt.119
It is said that an automatic discharge should be able to remove the stigma of
bankruptcy, give bankrupts the opportunity of prompt rehabilitation in relation to
their financial affairs, and encourage entrepreneurs to try again.120 Indeed, the
aim of the automatic discharge was to give benefit for those bankrupts who fully
co-operated with the official receiver and posed no risk to the public or other
business.121 Most importantly, the discharge could not only release the debtor
from his bankruptcy debts but with a view to give the debtor a fresh start. There-
fore, where automatic discharge is granted, it should be done with safeguards,
where rights were given to creditor or trustee to suspend the discharge if the
debtor fails to fulfil specific requirements such as:
(a) full and frank disclosure regarding and delivery up of his assets for reali-
sation for the benefit of his creditors,
117Section 279(2) of Insolvency Act 1986.
118J Tribe, ‘Discharge In Bankruptcy: An Examination of Personal Insolvency’s Fresh
Start Function In English Law’ (2012), Insolvency Intelligence.
119Ibid. It is claimed as some 20,000 bankruptcy orders are made each year in UK. See
further J Tribe (n 118).
120L Conway, ‘Discharge from Bankruptcy’ (2013), Library House of Commons Home
Affairs Section.
121Ibid.
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(b) full and frank disclosure of antecedent transactions that may be suscepti-
ble to attack, and
(c) where appropriate, the debtor making a contribution to the claims of cred-
itors out of surplus income (as defined by the local law in the light of the
economic circumstances applicable to the relevant jurisdiction).122
It is important to note that under section 279 (3) of the IA 1986, an application
to suspend the discharge of a bankruptcy order can be made by either the official
receiver or trustee of a bankrupt’s estate. According to section 279(3) (a)–(b) of
the IA 1986, the court may order that the automatic discharge shall cease to run
until the end of a specified period or the fulfilment of a specified condition. Sec-
tion 279(4) of the IA 1986 provides that the court may make an order to suspend
the automatic discharge only ‘if it is satisfied that the bankrupt has failed or is fail-
ing to comply with an obligation under this Part’. In the case of Bramston v
Haust,123 Kitchin LJ held that the aim of the power conferred by section 279 of
the IA 1986 was to extend the period of the bankruptcy and ensure that the bank-
rupt continued to suffer the disabilities arising from his undischarged bankruptcy
until he complied with his obligations under IA 1986. Such power was intended to
be a penalty in nature and used for purposes connected with the functions of the
official receiver and trustee in order to realise and distribute the bankrupt estate.
As noted, the court can make an order under section 252 suspending the
automatic discharge of the bankrupt for a specified period but the legislation does
include important limitations to this jurisdiction and safeguards in relation to its
exercise. It can be seen in particular at Rule 6.215 of the Insolvency Rules,
which provides that:
(1) The following applies where the official receiver applies to the court for
an order under section 279(3) (suspension of automatic discharge), but
not where he makes that application, pursuant to Rule 6.176(4), on the
adjournment of the bankrupt’s public examination.
(2) The official receiver shall with his application file a report setting out the
reasons why it appears to him that such an order should be made.
(3) The court shall fix a venue for the hearing of the application, and give
notice of it to the official receiver, trustee, and bankrupt.
(4) Copies of the official receiver report under this Rule shall be sent by him
to the trustee and the bankrupt to reach them at least 21 days before the
date fixed for the hearing.
(5) The bankrupt may file in court a notice specifying any statements in the
official receiver’s report which he intends to deny or dispute not later
than seven days before the date of the hearing.
If he gives notice under this paragraph, he shall send copies of it to
the official receiver and the trustee, not less than four days before the
date of the hearing.
122‘A Minimum Standard for Debt Discharge In Europe’ (2013) 26(7) Insolvency Intelli-
gence 97–112. <http://www.potamitisvekris.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/fil_publica
tions404572485.pdf> assessed 22 December 2016.
123[2012] EWCA Civ 1637, [2012] All ER (D) 127.
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(6) If on the hearing, the court makes an order suspending the bankrupt’s dis-
charge, copies of the order shall be sent by the court to the official recei-
ver, trustee, and bankrupt.
In the case of Bagnall v Official Receiver,124 the court granted the application
for suspension an automatic discharge made by the trustee on the grounds that
the bankrupt failed to fulfil his statutory obligations to give certain information
to his trustee. If the suspension order was not made, the creditor’s right might be
prejudiced. Late applications for such an order are not to be encouraged and the
lateness of any application might persuade the court not to grant the order
sought. Arden LJ made some remarks that under Rule 6.215 that ‘The policy
behind the rule 6.215 is that wherever possible the bankrupt should be given
notice of the applications and wherever possible he should be given an adequate
opportunity to consider the points in the trustee’s report’.125While in a recent
case of Wilson v William (Trustee in Bankruptcy for John Wilson),126 the appel-
lant bankrupt challenged an order made suspending his discharge from bank-
ruptcy as the district judge was satisfied that the bankrupt did not co-operate
with his trustee. The appeal was dismissed. Rose J decided that the bankrupt’s
failures were both serious and significant, and the district judge did not exercise
his discretion improperly. The bankrupt was afforded sufficient protection by
being able to apply to the court to have the suspension order discharged if the
trustee failed to file a report and the bankrupt considered that he fully complied
with his duties and obligations to his trustee.
5.1.1. BRO and BRU
One of the principal aims of bankruptcy law is to ‘relieve the honest debtor from
the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free from
the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes’.127 It
was emphasized that ‘the purpose of the bankruptcy act/law as being of public,
as well as private, interest in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor
who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of bank-
ruptcy a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered
by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt’.128 In relation to these
objectives, an automatic discharge was seen as a very practical way to deliver
the fresh start policy. Therefore it is important to distinguish between honest and
culpable bankrupts.129 Indeed, the effective application of an automatic dis-
charge, which seeks to give a second chance to the bankrupt, must be balanced
with public protection. Consequently, BRO was introduced for public protection
124[2003] EWHC 1398 (Ch); [2003] 3 All ER 613.
125See also R Jordan ‘In suspense’ (2014) New Law Journal, also published at <https://
www.newlawjournal.co.uk> assessed 30 August 2017.
126[2015] EWHC 1841 (Ch), [2015] All ER (D) 275.
127Local Loan Co v Hunt [1934] U.S Supreme Court 234.
128William v U.S Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1915) U.S Supreme Court 549.
129A Walters, ‘Personal Insolvency Law After the Enterprise Act: An Appraisal’ (2004),
Nottingham Law School.
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in a response to misconduct by a bankrupt in connection with the bankruptcy,
whether prior or subsequent to the bankruptcy order.130 It was reported that
applications for BRO are becoming more common.131 In addition, BRO was
introduced to place extended restrictions on the most culpable bankrupts
since the EA 2002 allows them to be discharged after a period of a year.
Moreover, the aims of IA 1986 in the UK regarding BRO being pointed are as
follows132:
(a) to allow lenders and the public to differentiate between culpable and non-
culpable bankrupts and make better-informed decisions in their dealing
with them, and
(b) to provide more effective protection for the public and the commercial
community against the small group of culpable bankrupts.
It is important to note that the Secretary of State, or the OR acting under the
direction of the Secretary, initiates the BRO. The application is supported by a
report from the Secretary of State and the date for the hearing is fixed at least
eight weeks in advance.133 An application for a BRO in respect of a bankrupt
must be made:
(a) before the end of the period of one year beginning with the date on
which the bankruptcy commences, or
(b) with the permission of the court.134
The duration of BRO must be a period of between two and fifteen years.
However, the order is not absolute. It may be rescinded by order of court.135
There is also provision for interim BRO before a BRO is granted if there is a
prima facie ground to suggest that the application for a BRO will be successful
and that it is in the public interest to make an interim order. An application for
an interim BRO can be made by giving a two-day notice to the bankrupt, who
may subsequently apply to set the order aside.136 Nevertheless, before the order
130M West, ‘Business Restriction Orders’ (2012) Enterprise Chambers.
131Civil Practice Bulletin, ‘Business Restrictions Orders’ (2014) UK Journals and Jour-
nals.
132K Moser, ‘Restrictions after Personal Insolvency’, (2013) JBL.
133Insolvency Act 1986 Schedule 4A para 1(2). Alternatively, BRU may be offered by a
bankrupt himself and shall have a same application as BRO. See also Insolvency Act
1986 Schedule 4A para 7(1).
134Insolvency Act 1986 Schedule 4A para 3(1).
135Insolvency Act 1986 Schedule 4A para 4(2).
136M West, ‘BROs’ (2012) Enterprise Chambers; See also Insolvency Act 1986 Schedule
4A para 1(2).
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is granted, the court is to take into account the behaviour of the bankrupt.137
However, it was argued that the list of factors, which the court is mandated by
statute to consider when deciding whether to make a BRO, is not exhaustive.138
The court could have regard to any relevant misconduct connected with the
bankruptcy. Furthermore, the law does not stipulate on what grounds the court
ought to consider that the making of an order is appropriate.139 The main effect
of BRO and BRU is to restrict the debtor from doing certain things. After the
order was made by the court a person who is subjected to a BRO or BRU140:
(a) Must not act as a director of a company or directly or indirectly take part
in or be concerned in the promotion, formation or management of a com-
pany without the leave of the court.
(b) Must not act as a member of an LLP or in the promotion, formation or
management of an LLP.
(c) may not act as a receiver or manager of the property of a company on
behalf of debenture-holders.
(d) May not hold public office or being a charity trustee or a trustee for a
charity, an insolvency practitioner or a member of a creditors’ committee.
(e) May not act a lasting power of attorney or exercising certain functions in
relation to pension schemes, personal equity plans, and individual savings
accounts.
Despite the spelled out restrictions, there are still worries that such restrictions
are far from being definite. This has been argued in the case of AIB v Wilson141
137Insolvency Act 1986 Schedule 4A para 2(2) states the behavior as follows; failing to
keep records which account for a loss of property by the bankrupt, or by a business car-
ried on by him, where the loss occurred in the period beginning 2 years before petition
and ending with the date of the application; failing to produce records of that kind on
demand by the official receiver or the trustee; entering into a transaction at an undervalue,
"undervalue" being defined in Insolvency Act 1986 sch 4A, para 2(4) by reference to
Insolvency Act 1986 s 339; giving a preference, defined in Insolvency Act 1986 sch 4A,
para 2(4) by reference to Insolvency Act 1986 s 340; making an excessive pension con-
tribution, defined in Insolvency Act 1986 sch 4A, para 2(4) by reference to Insolvency
Act 1986 s 342A; a failure to supply goods or services which were wholly or partly paid
for which gave rise to a claim provable in the bankruptcy; trading at a time before com-
mencement of the bankruptcy when the bankrupt knew or ought to have known that he
was himself to be unable to pay his debts; incurring, before commencement of the bank-
ruptcy, a debt which the bankrupt had no reasonable expectation of being able to pay;
failing to account satisfactorily to the court, the official receiver or the trustee for a loss
of property or for an insufficiency of property to meet bankruptcy debts; carrying on any
gambling, rash and hazardous speculation or unreasonable extravagance which may have
materially contributed to or increased the extent of the bankruptcy or which took place
between presentation of the petition and commencement of the bankruptcy; neglect of
business affairs of a kind which may have materially contributed to or increased the
extent of the bankruptcy; fraud or fraudulent breach of trust; or failing to cooperate with
the official receiver or the trustee.
138M West, ‘Business Restriction Orders’ (2012) Enterprise Chambers.
139Ibid.
140Ibid.
141Unreported September 23, 2013 (Sh Ct (Lothian) (Edinburgh).
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as the court is concerned that such an order was insufficiently specific so as to
give fair notice to the debtor of what they were restricted from doing. This was
an important point given the potential criminal consequences of a breach of a
BRO.142
On one hand, BRO is introduced to protect the public from culpable bank-
rupts; yet, on the other hand, the length of the restriction period seemed to act as
a punishment. In Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd,143 Dillon L.J. divided the
duration of a disqualification into three brackets according to the seriousness of
the case.144 It was pointed out that ‘…in deciding how much of 15 years needed
to disqualify, only serious cases, which may include someone who was already
disqualified should be for ten years and above; for six to ten years are those who
do not merit the top bracket and for two to five years, not very serious cases’.145
This classification was accepted in Randhawa v Official Receiver146 where it was
held that the appropriate period for a BRO must be fixed by reference to the
gravity of the misconduct taken in conjunction with any aggravating or mitigat-
ing factors.147
Despite the restrictions being spelled out, there are still worries that such
restrictions are far from being definite. This was argued in the case of AIB v
Wilson148 as the court was concerned that such an order was insufficiently
specific so as to give fair notice to the debtor of what it was that they were
restricted from doing. This was an important point given the potential criminal
consequences of a breach of a BRO.149
As mentioned earlier, one of the intentions of introducing an automatic dis-
charge is to remove the stigma of bankruptcy. However, it was contended that
the BRO itself could contribute to the increase in stigma with personal insol-
vency and appears to contradict the fresh-start policy.150 Firstly, some lenders
will directly reject the application for the discharged bankrupt to enter into any
contract with them once the person is declared bankrupt. Despite the BRO itself
being used to differentiate between culpable and non-culpable bankrupts, some
financial institutions may still decline to give financial assistance or loan. Sec-
ondly, the stigma of bankruptcy may also increase when the name of the dis-
charged bankrupt still remains on the financial institutions’ credit reference file
for certain period of time. Thirdly, the restrictions imposed on the bankrupt
means that once a person is an adjudicated bankrupt, he is no longer someone in
whom society can place its trust or confidence.151




146[2006] EWHC 2946 (Ch); [2007] 1 All ER 755.
147K Moser, ‘Restrictions after Personal Insolvency’ (2013) JBL.
148Unreported September 23, 2013 (Sh Ct (Lothian) (Edinburgh).
149Civil Practice Bulletin, ‘BROs’ (2014) UK Journals and Journals.
150K Moser, ‘Restrictions after Personal Insolvency’ (2013) JBL.
151Ibid.
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5.2. Discharges by court order
As regards to the statutory requirement to obtain an automatic discharge, a bank-
rupt who is not eligible to it may apply for discharge from bankruptcy by apply-
ing to the court. In the UK, discharge from bankruptcy by court order is
provided under section 280 IA 1986. A bankrupt may at any time apply to be
discharged from bankruptcy after the end of the five-year period after the date of
adjudication of bankruptcy. However, on an application, the court, under 280(2)
of IA 1986, may refuse to grant the discharge, grant the discharge or grant a
conditional discharge.
5.3. Discharge by court’s annulment
In addition to automatic discharge and discharge by order of the court, the court
has a discretionary power to annul a bankruptcy order as provided under sec-
tion 282(1) of IA 1986.152 The annulment of a bankruptcy order may be made
whether or not the bankrupt has been discharged from the bankruptcy where at
the time the order was made, the order ought not to have been made or the bank-
ruptcy debts and expenses of the bankruptcy have all, since the making of the
order, either being paid or secured for to the satisfaction of the court.153 Similar
to the provisions in Malaysia and Singapore, if the court annuls a bankruptcy
order, the effect of the annulment is as if the bankruptcy order had never been
made.
6. Evaluation on comparative law and practice between Malaysia,
Singapore and the UK
It should be noted that Malaysia’s BA 1967 and Singapore’s BA 1995 provide
three methods for the bankrupts to be discharged i.e. discharge by the certificate
of the DGI (or also known as OA in Singapore), court order, and annulment of
court. Even though these discharge provisions in both jurisdictions come from
the different statutes, there are a lot of similarities. The application to be dis-
charged by court order can be made at any time after the bankruptcy order was
made against the bankrupt. Furthermore, in both jurisdictions, the application to
annul the bankruptcy order may be made considering the time when the bank-
ruptcy order was made, the payment of the debts, the residence of the majority
creditors and where the court’s proceedings were pending.
It is important to note that there are still differences in the discharge of bank-
rupt by a certificate of the DGI or the OA. In Malaysia, the discharge application
can be made after a period of five years since the date of receiving order and
adjudication order were made, whereby in Singapore, this only can be made after
a duration of three years since the date of commencement of the bankruptcy; and
the debts which have been proven in bankruptcy need to be lesser than $500,000,
or such other sum as may be prescribed. Unfortunately, discharge by court order,
152A Keay and P Walton, Insolvency Law, Corporate and Personal (2nd edn Jordans
Publishing Limited, 2008).
153See further Henwood v Customs & Excise ([1998]; Halabi v London Borough of Cam-
den [2008]).
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annulment or certificate of DGI (Malaysia) or OA (Singapore) were considered as
complex as it involved very cumbersome procedures that made it very hard for
the discharge application to be granted. The period to be discharged from bank-
ruptcy is too long even when the bankrupt has given a good cooperation during
his bankruptcy and has no assets for the benefits of his estates. Like Malaysia and
Singapore, the UK IA 1986 also provides a bankrupt to be discharged by court
order and annulment of court. Interestingly, automatic discharge is available in the
UK since 2002.
As mentioned earlier, for the past few years, suggestions were made for
Malaysia and Singapore to review their bankruptcy laws and emulate the UK’s
automatic discharge. However, in Singapore the Insolvency Law Review Com-
mittee had rejected the proposal to introduce automatic discharge. Meanwhile, in
Malaysia when the Department of Insolvency proposed a reform of BA 1967 in
2015 the provision on automatic discharge was not included. Interestingly, the
new Bill 2016, tabled on 21 November 2016 in Parliament for its First Reading,
has introduced an automatic discharge. Under the new Bill 2016, a discharge is
available to a debtor three years after the submission of his statement of affairs
and subject to achieving the target contribution set by the DGI and having ren-
dered an account of monies and property to the DGI.
In Singapore, even though there is no provision for automatic discharge, the
proposal to discharge a first-time bankrupt who cannot resolve after seven years
in bankruptcy was tabled by the Law Ministry for the first time in Parliament on
11 May 2015. These moves are a step in a right direction to set a maximum per-
iod or duration for bankrupts to be discharged and get away from his bankruptcy
status and disabilities of being bankrupt. Meanwhile, in the UK, automatic dis-
charge was introduced in 2004, parallel with the objective of automatic discharge
as a fresh start policy, BRO or BRU is employed to protect the public from cul-
pable bankrupts, yet it seemed that the length of restriction period appeared to
act as a punishment.
7. Conclusion
In common law jurisdictions such as Malaysia, the UK, and Singapore, bank-
ruptcy laws allow the bankrupts to be discharged and have a fresh start. Indeed
these jurisdictions’ bankruptcy regimes are in line with the recommendations
made by INSOL, UNCITRAL, and the World Bank that effective insolvency
systems should be able to offer individual debtors a discharge from indebted-
ness as a method of concluding a bankruptcy procedure. However, in Malaysia
under the existing BA 1967, there is no automatic discharge. Accordingly, until
the new Bill 2016, which introduces automatic discharge, comes into force,
bankrupts will have to wait longer, while in Singapore, since the proposal to
include automatic discharge has been rejected, there is no automatic discharge
available to bankrupts. In conclusion, it can be seen from the discussion on
Malaysia, Singapore and the UK’s provisions for discharge that these provi-
sions aim to avoid that bankrupts continuously remain in a bankruptcy status
with no way out.
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